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Advisor: Regina Werum 
Scholars have grown increasingly interested in the association between climate 
conditions and social unrest. Though no consensus exists regarding the specific 
mechanisms that connect both phenomena, scholars have found a links between rising 
temperatures, precipitation, or the magnitude of disasters and social unrest. However, is 
unclear to what extent deviations from historical trends rather than absolute levels might 
serve as important indicators of unrest. Moreover, it remains unclear how effectively 
socio-demographic factors like quality of life and ethno-religious fragmentation can 
explain trends on unrest, net of climatological indicators. This project tests the extent to 
which deviation from historical trends in precipitation is associated with an increase in 
the frequency of protests in India (2016) – net of key indicators of quality of life and 
socio-economic fragmentation. District-level analyses employ satellite-based 
precipitation data and protest event data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data 
(ACLED) project, combined with socio-demographic data from the India Census and 
related sources. Results indicate that protests levels are associated with climatological 
and quality of life or social inequality indicators. Moreover, results generally indicate a 
strong relationship between deviation from historically average precipitation and protests. 
However, the direction of this association varies cross years. Implications of these results 
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Regional climate conditions are associated with social unrest, particularly in the 
context of global climate change (e.g. Kelley et al. 2015; Nardulli et al. 2015; O’Loughlin 
et al. 2012 or for a review see Carleton, Hsiang, and Burke 2016). One consequence of 
global climate change includes an increasing likelihood that climate will deviate from 
historical averages (Rind, Goldberg, and Ruedy 1989). This tendency of the climate to 
depart from what is normal historically may itself drive social unrest, particularly protest 
events. When measures of precipitation are included in models, they tend to focus on 
absolute levels of precipitation rather than relative deviations, the scope is generally 
restricted to analysis of rare events such as disasters or the onset of civil conflict, and 
these projects have typically examined countries or regions in Africa (e.g. Buhaug 2010; 
Buhaug et al. 2015; Burke et al. 2009; Hendrix and Salehyan 2012; Jones, Mattiacci, and 
Braumoeller 2017). Measuring precipitation relative to historical conditions is important 
because, for example, an arid region is dry relative to the rest of a nation, and although 
one might speculate that this is indicative of a drought and that protests should rise as a 
consequence, the people living in this hypothetical arid region are actually well adapted 
to the arid climate. If, on the other hand, an arid region experiences an unusually large 
amount of precipitation, flooding might occur, which may in turn lead to various forms of 
social unrest such as protest. Long term, public support for environmental spending is on 
the decline in the United States (Johnson and Schwadel 2019). Therefore, it is important 
to understanding the potential consequences of falling investment in the environment, 
especially the consequences of global climate change. 
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This study extends our understanding of the relationship between climate and 
social unrest by examining the relationship between precipitation and protest events in 
the politically volatile and climatologically diverse nation of India. Understanding the 
relationship between variation in weather (over time and across geographic units) and 
protests is important in order to understand the consequences of global climate 
variability. Researchers have long studied the consequences of environmental disasters. 
However, disaster studies essentially focus on the direct and indirect impact such rare 
events have on social instability, including food prices, mass migration/internal 
displacement, and ultimately unrest (for a review see Lindell 2013). 
In contrast, this study examines whether or not short- and medium effects on 
protest are produced by extremes in precipitation in both directions as drought and 
flooding may be associated with an increase in social unrest (Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel 
2013). Examining extreme climate conditions thus enables this study to focus on 
relatively common events that can produce short- and medium-term consequences for 
local populations including the propensity or frequency of protest. Changes in 
precipitation can lead to drought and flooding, which has an impact on the economy of 
the effected region (Burke et al 2009). If the economic impact is great enough, this may 
lead people in the region to protest as a method to petition the government to redress their 
economic woes. 
Factors related to quality of life may also influence protest. Economic indicators 
of quality of life such as the employment rate or income per capita are important 
predictors of unrest broadly (Alexander 2010; Buhaug 2011; Regan and Norton 2005). 
Likewise, prior research finds that the infant mortality rate and the literacy rate are 
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important proxies for quality of life (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017; Goldstone 2010). 
This analysis extends previous work by testing the influence of quality of life indicators 
on protest. 
Ethnic and religious fragmentation may also be important drivers of unrest (Beck 
2000; Cederman et al. 2011; Gubler 2012). Previous work finds that religious and ethnic 
divisions are an important driver of unrest broadly speaking. In the case of India in 
particular, religious fragmentation may be a particularly important driver of unrest 
(Kumar 2020; Olson and Li 2015). This analysis extends prior research by testing the 
relationship between ethno-religious fragmentation and protest. 
Social scientists have used varying definitions of protest (Tarrow 1993; Tilly 
1981; Opp 2000). For the purpose of this study protest is defined in terms of collective 
action events directed at the government or its officials (Tarrow 1993). First, India has 
experienced several waves of protests over the last decade (Chaudhuri and Fitzgerald 
2015; Kumar and Abi-Habib 2020; Nayak 2010; Raj and Abi-Habib 2019). Possible 
explanations include the current nationalist government, shifting demographics, and 
rising inequality (Kumar and Abi-Habib 2020; Raj and Abi-Habib 2019). Some detailed 
case studies suggest that growing nationalism and shifting gender politics contribute to 
mounting unrest (Chaudhuri and Fitzgerald 2015; Nayak 2010). 
Second, India represents an opportunity to study a comparatively young 
democracy as it moves through a politically volatile period (Chaudhuri and Fitzgerald 
2015; Kumar and Abi-Habib 2020; Nayak 2010; Raj and Abi-Habib 2019). As such, it 
builds on extant literature regarding determinants of non-violent protest (which 
frequently focus on established democracies) as well literature on determinants of violent 
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unrest (which frequently focus on failed states and rare events (riots, coups, revolutions) 
(e.g. Buhaug et al 2011; Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011). Moreover, as one 
of the world’s most populous nations and a major regional power aspiring to global 
ascendancy, patterns observed in India might lend themselves to extrapolation (Perkovich 
2003; United Nations 2019). 
Third, India is demographically and climatologically diverse. Climatologically, 
India has arid deserts to the west, a temperate region to the north, and tropical conditions 
to the south east (Kumar et al. 2011). India is also demographically diverse, with a wide 
variety of religious and ethnic groups (Aiyar and Tillin 2020). This combination of 
factors makes India an ideal case study to examine protest outside of the industrialized 
countries that typically provide the focus for social scientific analysis. 
The social sciences have sought to develop and evaluate general models of 
phenomena thought to be related to protest, like riots, revolutions, and other forms of 
social unrest with moderate success (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017; Goldstone et al. 
2010). One set of characteristics these social science models tend to share, however, is 
that they tend to focus on the social, political, and structural determinants of protests 
(Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017). This study will evaluate the impact of climate trends in 
precipitation on the frequency of protests. The purpose of this study is to examine the 
relationship between climate (specifically deviation from historical precipitation) and the 
frequency of protests at the district level in India in 2016, the most recent year for which 
data are available. Using protest data paired with social, cultural, economic, and 
demographic indicators drawn from nationally representative sources, this study will 
advance understanding of the relationship between protests and precipitation. 
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Social scientists have long studied the social determinants of protest as well as the 
consequences of disasters on various forms of social instability.  However, the extent to 
which climatological conditions (especially precipitation) shape social unrest net of social 
conditions has yet to be clearly articulated. This study is a step towards explaining the 
relationship between extreme precipitation-related conditions and unrest. 
Literature Review 
 
Theories of Social Unrest 
Social unrest is broadly defined in terms of a collection of forms of unrest 
including protests, strikes, and clashes with police, as well as more radical forms 
including revolution or civil war (Tilly 1981; also see e.g., Goldstone 2010; Gurr 1970; 
McCarthy and Zald 1977; Skocpol 1994; Tarrow 1993; Tarrow 1994). Previous work has 
tended to focus on how and why governments go through dramatic change, whether that 
be through revolution, civil war, or nonviolent collective action (Cederman, Weidmann, 
and Gleditsch 2011; Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017; Gubler and Selway 2012; Keddie 
1995; Lindvall 2013; Regan and Norton 2005; Tilly 1978). Examining the determinants 
of major historical events such as revolutions, coups, or civil wars is important as it 
enables researchers to include countries beyond the U.S. and thus helps rectify a potential 
weakness of social movements’ literature. Despite the difficulties associated with the 
study of rare events like revolutions, efforts to pinpoint general principles and forces that 
generate social unrest continue to improve, as do efforts to test whether scientists can 
extrapolate to make predictions about other forms of social unrest such as political 
protests (Chenoweth and Belgioioso 2019; Goldstone 2019).  
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The Focal Form of Social Unrest: Protest Events 
The key form of social unrest in this analysis is protest. Protest is defined in terms 
of collective action events directed at the government or its officials (Tarrow 1993). 
Sociologists and political scientists tend to focus on protests aimed at the state rather than 
(e.g.) those aimed at corporations or other private entities because researchers often study 
protest within the context of a wider political or social movement (e.g. Tarrow 1993; 
Tilly 1981). Oop (2000) differentiates individual protest from collective protest. 
Collective protest is defined as collective action such as demonstrations or traffic 
blockades that is predicated on coordination among many individuals, and individual 
protests as protest that requires little collective coordination. Protests are easier to study 
than revolutions, riots, or other forms of social unrest because protests are relatively 
common in comparison, and yet may be intrinsically related to the larger historical 
undercurrent of social unrest (Opp 2000). Consequently, there are more observations 
along which to compare variation in precipitation. This paper extends the current 
literature by examining protest events as a measure of unrest, rather than social unrest 





The Role of Environmental Conditions in Shaping Protests 
The idea that the climate can affect the politics of a nation can be found as early 
as the enlightenment era political philosophy of Montesquieu. In The Spirit of the Laws, 
Montesquieu speculates that certain differences between the German and Spanish legal 
system can be attributed to differences in climate (Davis and Evans, 1777). Montesquieu 
originally speculated that people become more suspicious of authority in warm climates, 
people are generally more volatile in warmer climates, and consequently the law reflects 









Figure 1: Conceptual Antecedents of Unrest 
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While Montesquieu’s proposition (as well as their ecological fallacy and potential 
for spuriousness) have been challenged widely, meta-analysis seems to confirm a positive 
causal association between temperatures and unrest (Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel 2013). 
After reviewing 60 primary studies of both precipitation and temperature, Hsiang and 
colleagues standardized temperature and precipitation “whenever possible” and found 
that deviation from mean temperature and precipitation are associated with an increase in 
the risk of unrest. Hsiang and colleges additionally find that the relationship between 
temperature and precipitation is best specified with a nonlinear term. They conclude that 
there is greater consensus that a relationship between climate and social unrest exists than 
others have suggested (Scheffran et al. 2012). 
Changes in the climate may have contributed to the collapse of several ancient 
civilizations. Manning and colleagues (2017) find that a volcanic eruption suppressed 
flooding along the Nile river which in turn suppressed crop production and led to a series 
of revolts in Ptolemaic Egypt (circa 305-30 BCE). One study of China attributes dynastic 
change to climatologically cold periods and lower crop production (Zhang et al. 2005). 
Another study contends that the collapse of the Akkadian empire to a sudden shift of the 
region to a more arid climate (Cullen et al. 2000). A recent article from Kaniewski et al. 
(2020) detailed a study of the eastern Mediterranean region spanning 6000 years, finding 
that major social changes tend to occur during cooler periods. Understanding the way 
climate has influenced civilization historically can bring clarity to the forces that drive 
contemporary events. 
More recently, climate may have contributed to the conflict in Syria and research 
indicates that ongoing conflict in Africa is a consequence of climate change (Hendrix and 
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Salehyan 2012; Kelly 2015; Raleigh and Kniveton 2012; Uexkull, d’Errico, and Jackson 
2020; O’Loughlin et al. 2012; Meier, Bond, and Bond 2007). Critics argue that there is 
not sufficient evidence that the relationship between climate and unrest exist (Buhaug 
2010; Buhaug 2015; Selby 2016). However, other research has implicated the economic 
impact of climate change and growing climate volatility as a driver of unrest (e.g. Burke, 
Marshall, and Hsiang 2015). A clear understanding of the mechanisms that explain the 
relationship between climate and protests are needed to properly evaluate models of 
protest. 
One common hypothesis is that climatological conditions lead to food scarcity, 
and in turn political unrest (Jones, Mattiacci, and Braumoeller 2017). Recent research has 
examined the relationship between disruptions in the food supply and political instability 
and upheaval in a variety of contexts, from sub-Saharan Africa to the Middle East (Jones, 
Mattiacci, and Braumoeller 2017; Weinberg and Bakker 2015). However, efforts to draw 
a direct link between environmental instability (not limited to extreme weather) and 
shocks to the food production system has produced inconsistent results (Burke et al. 
2009; Yeeles 2015; Dell, Jones, and Olken 2012; Buhaug et al. 2015; Dian et al. 2005; 
Manning 2017; Scheffran et al. 2012; Van Loon et al. 2016) with some researchers 
finding robust relationships between temperature, rainfall, and social unrest (e.g. Jones, 
Mattiacci, and Braumoeller 2017), and others finding weak or null results (Buhaug et al. 
2015). These inconsistent results may reflect that many of the country-level or 
geographically based socioeconomic indicators typically used as controls are themselves 
patterned by environmental forces and thus might confound the empirical relationship 
between environmental stressors and unrest patterns. Additionally, previous research has 
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focused on long term temperature changes in the climate or drought, however few studies 
have considered very wet conditions or flooding as another potential source of unrest 
(Buhaug et al. 2015; Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel 2015; Dian et al. 2005; Hsiang, Burke, 
and Miguel 2013; Van Loon et al. 2016). This study extends the current literature by 
examining very wet conditions, typical of the annual monsoon season in parts of India 
(Kumar et al. 2011). 
Climatologists have long used historically standardized rainfall to study drought 
(Guttman 1999; Hayes et al. 1999; McKee, Doesken, and Kleist 1993). This measure is 
generally referred to as the Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI) (Guttman 1999; 
McKee et al. 1993). The Standardized Precipitation Index is now widely accepted as a 
standard measure of precipitation in terms of the historical mean for a given region (see 
for instance Hayes et al. 1999; Van Loon et al. 2016). 
 
The Role of Inequalities and Quality of Life in Shaping Protests 
The contemporary theory of relative deprivation originates with Gurr’s book Why 
men rebel. According to relative deprivation theory, people engage in collective action 
when there is a gap between what they believe they are entitled to from society and what 
they actually have. When perceived entitlements lag behind actual benefits, this is called 
a grievance, and Gurr notes that these grievances are not evenly distributed throughout 
society – rather they are concentrated within certain social groups. Members of these 
groups tend to compare themselves to their place society at large in order to determine 
their perceived entitlements and their grievances. When members of a particular group 
recognize that inequitable conditions relative to other groups, these grievances leads to 
greater social unrest (Gurr 1970). Therefore, relative deprivation theory predicts that 
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inter-group inequality will drive social unrest, including protest. This analysis extends the 
current literature by examining inequalities as they pertain specifically to protests. 
Economic factors, particularly economic inequality give rise to both violent and 
nonviolent social movements, particularly when standards of living are compromised by 
economic turmoil (Beck 2000; Buhaug et al. 2011; Cederman et al. 2011; Muller and 
Seligson 1987; Opp 2000; Regan and Norton 2005). At the district level of analysis, 
variation in income per capita may capture economic inequality between districts and 
may contribute to protest as a consequence. However, as a democracy India may 
conversely experience higher rates of protest in places with a higher per capita income, 
because economic growth and democratic participation such as protest may be mutually 
reinforcing (Kurzman, Werum, and Burkhart 2002). Variation in the employment rate 
may also contribute to protest, not only because of the social inequality associated with 
employment (or conversely unemployment), but because when employment is low the 
unemployed have the time to engage in social unrest (Kelley et al. 2015; Leenders, 2012). 
Population, urbanicity, and infant mortality are important demographic indicators 
of unrest (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017; Goldstone et al. 2010). Chenoweth and Ulfelder 
(2017) found that a model containing population on its own is nearly as powerful a 
predictor of social unrest as more complex models of unrest, with protests tending to 
occur in more populous places. In general urban populations tend to experience more 
unrest than rural areas (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017). Infant mortality is another 
commonly used demographic indicator of unrest, and previous research finds that infant 
mortality increases so will social unrest (Goldstone et al. 2010). This paper will test 
whether this finding can be extended to protest events. Finally, the literacy rate is found 
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to have a positive association with social unrest (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017). This 
paper will test whether or not the literacy rate has the same positive association with 
protests as it has with social unrest broadly. 
 
The Role of Ethno-Religious Fragmentation In Shaping Protest 
Durkheim (1912) theorized that shared religious identity and belief serve a 
fundamental role in the establishment of group identity. For Durkheim shared religious 
symbolism generates social conformity and shared identity though a communal system of 
belief and ritualistic practice, and religious conflict tends to occur when religions meet. 
Modern scholars theorize that contact between people of differing religious identity can 
sometimes generate inter-religious competition and at other times inter-religious trust 
(Borgonovi 2008; Olson and Li 2015). In the case of nations (like India) were a large 
percentage of the population are religious, wherever there is greater religious 
heterogeneity (as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) discussed at 
greater length below) there is far less trust for members of other religions, which may in 
turn contribute to an increase in protests (Olson and Li 2015). India is a great case study 
because the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) controls the Indian parliament 
(Aiyar and Tillin 2020). It may be that BJP control is a symptom of inter-religious 
conflict. 
 A similar vein of research focuses on racial or ethnic group threats (Cederman et 
al. 2011; Leenders 2012) or racial divides (Olzak, Shanahan, and McEneaney 1996) as 
determinants of social unrest. In general, salient group identities whether religious, 
ethnic, or racial may demarcate social inequalities that generate social unrest. India is a 
great case study because of its ethnic and religious diversity. India was historically 
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organized into a stratified caste system which defined rigid social roles for individuals 
based on the caste that they are born into, and some castes face active discrimination. 
India also has a number of native tribal populations that are historically disadvantaged 
(Chanana 1993). Although the caste system has been outlawed in India individuals who 
may otherwise be discriminated against based on these historical inequalities still have a 
protected status through The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of 
Atrocities) Act of 1989. Protests may therefore be more frequent in places where 
historically disadvantaged caste and tribal populations are concentrated because there is 
greater potential for intergroup contact.  
Hypotheses 
 
Climate and Precipitation 
H1: Consecutive years of unusual precipitation have a compounding impact on protests 
examined here in terms of its additive properties. 
H2: Deviation from the mean precipitation (SPI) will increase the frequency of protests 
events (examined here at the district level of analysis over one year). 
H2a: Deviation from the mean precipitation (SPI) will increase the frequency of protests 
linearly. 
H2b: Deviation from mean precipitation (SPI) will have a curvilinear relationship with 
the frequency of protests. 
Quality Of Life 
H3: Districts with a low employment rate will be associated with an increase in the 
frequency of protest events. 
14 
 
H4: Districts with relatively higher income per capita will have a correspondingly greater 
frequency of protest events. 
H5: The literacy rate at the district level will be positively associated with protests. 
H6: The infant mortality rate will be positively associated with protests. 
Ethno-Religious Fragmentation 
H7: More religiously heterogeneous districts will be associated with a relatively greater 
frequency of protests. 
H8: Seats held by the BJP will have a positive association with protests. 
H9: Percent population in a scheduled caste will have a positive association with protests. 




The 640 districts in India are the unit of analysis for this examination of the focal 
relationship between precipitation and protest events. As a unit of analysis, districts are 
somewhat analogous to counties in the United States. Two variables – income per capita 
and seats held by the BJP party – are measured at the state or union territory level (n=35). 
States of India are an administrative boundary larger than districts with their own 
government while union territories are administered by the federal government. In the 
case of per capita income, data is not available below the state level. Consequently, the 
assumption that the districts in each state are independent observations for these two 




The rest of this section will describe each data source. See the “variables” section 
for details on the operationalization of variables. 
Protest Data: The dependent variable for this study is the frequency of protest at 
the district level in 2016, derived from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data 
Project (ACLED) (ACLED 2019).1 Several organizations manage databases of reports 
detailing events such as protests, violent uprising, and intergroup conflict. ACLED data 
are collected using secondary sources, including traditional media, reports drafted by 
non-government organizations, and in some cases local partners and verified new media 
including blogs and social networking platforms, and are hand coded by a team of 
researchers (ACLED 2020). Although ACLED relies on traditional media which has 
documented bias towards underreporting events that are not newsworthy media coverage 
remains the best way to measure the occurrence of particular protest events (Demarest 
and Langer 2019; McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith 1996; Mueller 1997; Oliver and Maney 
2000; Smith et al. 2001). A detailed description of the operationalization and 
interpretation of the protest variable derived from ACLED is outlined below. 
Data on Climate Conditions: The primary independent variable was derived 
from the Climate Hazards Group InfraRed Precipitation with Station (CHIRPS) data, a 
longitudinal data set generated using a combination of satellite and weather station data 
(Funk et al. 2015). CHIRPS data calibrates satellite-based precipitation data using global 
                                                          
1 In addition to ACLED, two other databases were evaluated for use in this study; the Integrated Crisis 
Early Warning System (ICEWS) (Boschee et al. 2015) and the Global Data on Events Location and Tone 
(GDELT) (Leetaru and Schrodt 2013) database. These three data sources rely heavily on news or other 
media sources to detect protest events. GDELT and ICEWS use machine learning algorithms to 
automatically code news articles to detect reports of protest events, but they may over count events or 
include redundant entries (Demarest and Langer 2019; Wang et al. 2016). Based on these data quality 




long term rain gauge data. Precipitation is measured as the total (sum) of rainfall in a 
given area, and should be interpreted as a measure of how wet or dry a particular 
geographic region is over time. Long term rain gauge and satellite geospatial data are 
available for a five-degree latitude/longitude grid, which were aggregated to districts for 
the 2011 census of India using geographic information system (GIS) software. Since 
2011 Indian district boundaries have changed. In cases where data used political 
boundaries more recent than 2011, districts were matched to the corresponding 2011 
location by hand. In some cases, missing values were introduced because certain districts 
could not be meaningfully matched. A detailed description of the way this study 
operationalizes the precipitation variable and data limitations are outlined below. 
Demographic Data: Other demographic data come from the 2011 Census of 
India (Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner 2011), The India Election 
Commission (Indian Election Commission nd), the Million Death Study 2012 (MDS) 
(Ram et al. 2013), and the Economic and Statistical Organization of Punjab (2020). Most 
demographic data used to gauge social inequalities and quality of life indicators come 
from the 2011 Census of India, a decennial census of the Indian population. The Census 
of India provides data for all 640 districts in 2011. Data regarding seats held in the BJP 
comes from the Indian Election Commission, the supervising body of election results in 
India. Values are reported for the most recent election before 2011. Infant mortality data 
were collected in partnership with the World Health Organization and the Centre for 
Global Health Research and identify various causes of premature death in India. Due to 
missing data on protest event frequencies, infant mortality, per capita income, and SPI, 107 
districts were excluded from the multivariate analysis. Finally, state-level income per 
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capita income estimates come from a report published by the Economic and Statistical 
Organization of Punjab. All districts in a given state are assigned the same per capita 




Protest events come from the ACLED dataset and are recorded as the frequency 
of reported protests in a district of India. ACLED defines protest events as nonviolent (at 
least with respect to protesters) political action aimed at government, or other groups and 
contrary to many definitions of protest, ACLED includes businesses, or institutions (e.g. 
Tarrow 1993). Protests include peaceful protests, protests with police intervention, and 
protests with police intervention that result in protester injuries. Riots and other forms of 
violent political decent are coded separately by ACLED and are excluded from this 
analysis. Protests often involve unorganized action by members of society, and so the 
definition is more expansive that Opp’s (2000) concept of a collective protest. Protest 
events are originally collected as individual observations and associated latitude 
longitude values. For the purposes of this analysis, protest event data was aggregated 
from the latitude/longitude level to the district level, and should be interpreted as a count 
or frequency. The average district had 16.01 protests in 2016, but the distribution is 
highly skewed (SD = 48.928), with a minimum of 0 protests and a maximum of 597 
protests in the capital district of Deli that year. In multivariate analyses, changes in 





The key climatological measure in this analysis is precipitation. In particular, this 
paper focuses on extreme or unusual climate over the course of a year, defined in terms 
of the deviation of precipitation in a particular time and place from the historical average 
for the place in question. This standardized precipitation measure is often referred to as 
the Standardized Precipitation index (SPI) (Guttman 1999, Hayes et al. 1999). In 
multivariate regression analyses, coefficients for the SPI should be interpreted as the 
effect of the deviation in precipitation for the given year from the historical average on 
protests. 
In order to test hypothesis H1, the association of SPI and protest is evaluated for 
multiple years of SPI from 2010 to 2016 simultaneously. In order to test hypothesis H2b 
nonlinear terms are included for each year of SPI. Not only do Hsaing and colleagues 
(2013) find support for this representation in their meta-analysis, the nonlinear 
representation of SPI is theoretically justified.2 Relatively dry districts have SPI values 
lower than zero while relatively wetter districts have SPI values greater than zero. 
Therefore a nonlinear term is needed in order to allow the frequency of protests to 
increase in either the positive or negative direction. 
Precipitation data for the year 2016 are used in this analysis, the same year for 
which ACLED data on protests are available. Although CHIRPS provides raw 
precipitation data, raw precipitation does not provide any information about how unusual 
the precipitation is for a given region relative to the historical average. To address this, 
Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI) values were obtained for each district and for each 
                                                          
2 Nonlinearities are commonly found in the study of social unrest, and quadratic or cubic terms for some of 
the socio-demographic terms may be appropriate in this analysis as well. Socio-demographic nonlinearities 
are not included for the sake of parsimony. This analysis is focused on precipitation. 
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year from 2010 to 2016, using the thirty years prior to standardize the measure.3 SPI 
values are a continuous measure of deviation from the historical mean in standardized 
units. The further the absolute value of the SPI measure is from zero, the further the 
district deviates from the historical mean in 2016. For example, SPI values in 2016 range 
from -2.9 to 2.2 standard deviations from the historical average for the district. The mean 
of 0.3 indicates that the average district was slightly wetter than is typical for the past 30 
years.  
Social Inequality and Quality of Life Indicators 
Multivariate analyses include four distinct quality of life measures, some of which 
also gauge social inequalities. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1: Data for the 
employment rate come from the 2011 Census of India. The employment rate is measured 
as the population employed divided by the total population. The mean district has an 
employment rate of around 40%. 
Per capita income measures the income of the average person. It is estimated at 
the state and union territory level (N = 35) reported in 1,000 Rupees units. While the 
poorest state averages only 20.7 thousand rupees per person, the wealthiest averages 
168.6 thousand rupees per person. 
The census also includes the literacy rate, measured as the literate population over 
the total population. In the average district, approximately 62% of the inhabitance are 
literate, and district level literacy rates range from approximately 29% literate to 89%. 
Infant mortality rates are generally linked to social inequality and (lack of) quality 
of life. Infant mortality rates are measured as the proportion of deaths for infants between 
                                                          
3 Special thanks to Michael Hayes and Beichen Zang for providing SPI data derived from CHIRPS. 
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0 and 28 days old and were collected for 2012.  The Million Death Study estimates that 
an average district has an infant mortality rate for infants between zero and thirty two 
months old at approximately 30%. However, the infant mortality rate ranges by district 
from only 0.4% to 6.5% indicating a substantial degree of inequality with respect to 
infant mortality. 
Group Threat and Ethno-Religious Fragmentation Indicators 
The percentage of the full population who are members of each religious group is 
to gauge the religious diversity of India. The average district is overwhelmingly Hindu, 
with 77.8% of the population reporting that they belong to the Hindu faith during the 
2011 census. The largest religious minority group is Muslim, and the average district is 
13.3% Muslim, followed by Christian (2.9%), Sikh (2.7%), Buddhist (1.2%), and Jain 
(0.3%). The minimum of each value is relatively low, and with the exception of the Jain, 
the maximum is relatively high.4 
However, rather than using proportional representation, this study employs 
measure of religious group mixing: religious heterogeneity is operationalized as minus 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) (Borgonovi 2008). The HHI is a measure of 
concentration among discrete components, and is calculated as the sum of squared 
proportions or alternative representation with the formula ∑ (𝑥 )  where xi is the 
proportion of persons in a given category and k is the number of categories (Hirschman 
1964). Although originally developed in econometrics the HHI is sometimes used by 
scholars of religion as a measure of religious homogeneity (Borgonovi 2008). Lower 
values on the HHI as less homogeneous and higher values as more homogeneous. To 
                                                          
4 The proportion of persons practicing each religion is included in the summary statistics. However, only 
the religious heterogeneity construct is used in the regression models reported below. Models that include 
religious percentages were estimated and are available upon request. 
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obtain the opposite interpretation this paper follows the example laid out by Olson and Li 
(2015) and take one minus the HHI as a measure of religious heterogeneity so that lower 
values represent religiously homogeneous districts while high values represent religiously 
heterogeneous districts. The score is standardized for the purposes of this analysis in 
order to make the model coefficient more easily interpretable. 
To gauge ethnic fragmentation, particularly as it relates to inequality and 
stratification, a measure of the percent population in a scheduled caste and percent 
population in a scheduled tribe are included. In 1989 the Parliament of India enacted the 
Scheduled Caste and Tribes Act which made it illegal to discriminate against members of 
historically disadvantaged tribes and castes. Members of scheduled castes and tribes are 
therefore likely targets of overt as well as systemic discrimination. Members of these 
“scheduled castes” and “scheduled tribes” are tabulated in the 2011 Census of India and 
presented here as the percent of the population in a caste or tribe out of the total 
population in a district. The mean district is made up of 13.6 percent scheduled tribe and 
16.1 percent scheduled caste. 
The other state-level indicator of political climate in the state is the percent of 
seats held by the ruling Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in each state. 
Seats held by the BJP may represent the hold the Hindu nationalist movement has in a 
given state of India. The BJP controls 25.1% of the seats in the average state legislature. 
The BJP has the least influence in at least one state with 0% BJP controlled seats, and the 
most influence in a state with 64.3% BJP controlled seats. 
Control Variables 
It is well known that urbanicity is strongly linked to unrest events and so 
urbanicity is controlled for in the models below (Chenoweth & Ulfelder 2017). 
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Urbanicity is measured as the urban population (as defined by the census) over the total 
population for a given district, and ranges from 0% (entirely rural) to 100% (entirely 
urban). Total population is the total number of people residing in each district divided by 
one thousand and is included as an exposure term. The population of the mean district 
was only 24.7% urban, or conversely 75.3% rural. Although the average district had a 
population of 2001.09 thousand people, the range is fairly wide; the most populous 
district holds approximately 11,060,150 people, while the smallest district contains only 
21,170 people. 
Data and Variable Limitations 
The data sources and variables used in this analysis have limitations. Protest data 
drawn from ACLED is based on media-reported events, which causes the under-count of 
some newsworthy events (Demarest & Langer 2019; McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith 
1996; Mueller 1997; Oliver and Maney 2000; Smith et al. 2001). Additionally, although 
most of the data are drawn from the Census of India there may still be some nonresponse 
bias (Olson 2006). Infant mortality and per capita income data were collected using a 
probability sample and may contain any of the bias associated with survey research. 
Finally, although every variable except SPI 2016 and its squared term are measured 
temporally prior to the frequency of protest events, time order is not sufficient on its own 
to establish causality. Any causal interpretation of these results should therefore be 
treated with caution. 
After missing data were accounted for via list-wise deletion, 533 districts remain 
in the analysis.5 Summary statistics after list-wise deletion are relatively close in 
                                                          
5 606 observations are available for protest event frequencies, 574 for infant mortality, 636 for per capita 
income, and 633 districts are available for each year of SPI. 640 observations for all other variables. 
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magnitude compared to the same set of summary statistics before list-wise deletion. T-
tests were used to evaluate differences in means between the analytic sample and the full 
sample as well as the observations for which data are missing only. There are significant 
(α < 0.05) differences in the means of scheduled caste, scheduled tribe, as well as percent 
Hindu and percent Christian, although there was no significant difference for religious 
heterogeneity. Districts after list-wise deletion were also compared to observations for 
which values are missing with significant (α < 0.05) differences in the means for SPI for 
the years 2010, 2011, 2013, and 2014, as well as percent seats held by the BJP, 
population, religious heterogeneity, percent population Hindu, percent population 
Christian, percent population in a scheduled caste, percent population in a scheduled 
tribe, and the employment rate. 
Although it is often hypothesized that climate conditions drive food scarcity, 
which in turn drives social unrest broadly, food data are not included in this analysis. 
However, other demographic indicators like infant mortality may be collinear with food 
insecurity, potentially serving as a proxy. Moreover, findings with respect to the food 
scarcity hypothesis have been inconsistent potentially indicating that alternative 
mechanisms like infant mortality or economic measures such as per capita income and 
the employment rate should be considered.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Districts of India 
 
Variable (Unit) Source Mean SD Min Max 
      
Unrest Indicators 
    Protests 2016 (Frequency) ACLED 16.0 48.9 0 597 
      
Climate Indicators 
    SPI 2010 (Standard Deviation) CHIRPS 0.7 1.2 -2.2 2.8 
    SPI 2011 (Standard Deviation) CHIRPS 0.6 0.8 -1.8 2.2 
    SPI 2012 (Standard Deviation) CHIRPS 0.3 0.7 -1.6 1.8 
    SPI 2013 (Standard Deviation) CHIRPS 0.8 0.9 -1.4 2.7 
    SPI 2014 (Standard Deviation) CHIRPS -0.1 0.7 -2.2 2.8 
    SPI 2015 (Standard Deviation) CHIRPS -0.1 0.9 -2.2 2.5 
    SPI 2016 (Standard Deviation) CHIRPS 0.3 1.1 -2.9 2.3 
      
Quality of Life Indicators 
    Total Population Employed 2011 (%) Census 40.7 6.88 25.8 66.9 
    State Income Per Capita 2011 (1000 
    Rupees) 
ESOP 49.1 23.6 20.7 169 
    Total Population Literacy 2011 (%) Census 62.0 10.3 28.8 88.7 
    Infant (0-28 days old) Mortality 
    2012 (%) 
MDS 3.0 1.1 0.4 6.5 
      
Ethno-Religious Fragmentation Indicators 
    Population Hindu 2011 (%) Census 77.8 22.3 1.0 99.2 
    Population Muslim 2011 (%) Census 13.3 17.3 0.2 98.5 
    Population Christian 2011 (%) Census 2.9 8.2 0.0 74.5 
    Population Sikh 2011 (%) Census 2.7 12.0 0.0 93.3 
    Population Buddhist 2011 (%) Census 1.2 6.0 0.0 69.9 
    Population Jain 2011 (%) Census 0.3 0.6 0.0 5.4 
    Religious Heterogeneity 2011 (SD) Census 0 1 -1.5 4.0 
    State Seats Held by the BJP 2011 (%) IEC 25.1 22.2 0.0 64.3 
    Population Protected Caste 2011 (%) Census 16.1 8.7 0.0 50.2 
    Population Protected Tribe 2011 (%) Census 13.6 21.3 0.0 98.6 
      
Control Variables 
    Population Urban 2011 (%) Census 24.7 19.0 0.0 100 
    Total Population 2011 (10000 Persons) Census 200 153 2 1106 






Negative binomial regression models are used in order to evaluate the relationship 
between historically aberrant precipitation and the frequency of protest events. Either a 
Poisson regression or a negative binomial regression is the appropriate modeling 
technique for a frequency dependent variable that follows a Poisson distribution, or if the 
event is relatively rare. The need for Zero-inflated models is tested, finding they preform 
nearly identically to models without zero inflation. Testing whether or not relaxing the 
dispersion assumption is warranted, findings indicate that the null hypothesis of no over 
dispersion is rejected with p < 0.001, indicating that the negative binomial model should 
be used. In addition to the negative binomial regression model, a linear regression model 
is estimated (though not reported) as a robustness check. Linear regression results are 
largely consistent in terms of direction and magnitude with the results presented here. 
An exposure term is used to transform the outcome variable to a rate. In an 
exposure, the natural log of the variable is taken, and the coefficient is held constant at 1. 
In the case of each model presented below, population is the exposure term. Therefore the 
outcome is interpreted as a rate of protests over population. 
To test for possible collinearity issues, Pearson’s correlations were calculated, and 
are reported in Appendix One. The largest coefficient is between percent Hindu and the 
religious heterogeneity construct. Consequently, each model tested in Table 2 below 
includes only religious heterogeneity and none of the percent of religion from which the 
religious heterogeneity construct is derived. 
First, a model of protest count regressed on only the control variable urbanicity 
and the population exposure term is estimated. Urbanicity is a significant predictor of 
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unrest (P<0.001) and has an incident rate ratio of 1.03 (CI = 1.02, 1.04), an AIC of 3571 
and a BIC of 3584. Next, in order to evaluate the social and demographic parameters as 
well as urbanicity is estimated. Then, in order to evaluate the linear association of SPI 
with protests, a model is estimated with linear terms for each year of SPI considered as 
well as urbanicity. In order to evaluate the curvilinear association of SPI with protests. 
Finally, a full model with all of the variables is estimated. 
Results of the Multivariate Analysis  
 
Negative binomial regression results are reported in table two below. Coefficients 
are reported as incident rate ratios, meaning that a unit change in any single independent 
variable should be interpreted as multiplicative change in the number of protest events 
per thousand persons. IRRs values less than one indicate relative decrease in the outcome 
per unit change whereas coefficient values greater than one indicate a relative increase in 
the outcome per unit change. Lower and upper confidence levels are also provided in 
parentheses, and significant terms at an alpha less than 0.05 are marked in boldface rather 
than with more traditional asterisks as a space saving measure. 
Hypothesis H1 was that consecutive years of SPI have a compounding impact on 
the frequency of protest events. Results largely support this hypothesis. In the linear 
model, curvilinear and full model multiple years have their own independent effect on the 
frequency of protest events per unit population. Since multiple independent years are 
significant, they sum together to have a total effect on the frequency of protests per unit 
population. However, whether or not cumulative effects across consecutive similar years 
– for example two consecutive dry years or two consecutive wet years – cannot be clearly 
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determined from these results since the consecutive similarity of years is not modeled 
here. The consecutive similarity hypothesis could be tested with an alternate model using 
a measure of the difference between any two consecutive SPI values. 
Hypothesis H2 states that deviation from the mean will increase the likelihood of 
protests. Hypothesis H2a is that H2 holds linearly, and H2a is that H2 holds when 
nonlinear terms are introduced. Both claims are largely supported. Linear deviation of 
precipitation from the mean is significant for the years 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015, 
though not for 2011 and 2016. When nonlinear terms are added to the model, they are 
significant for 2010, 2011, 2014, and 2016.  
One unusual result is that the direction of linear terms for SPI is not constant. In 
the linear only model SPI 2013 and 2016 are negatively related to protests, indicating that 
when the year is relatively dry, it also has more protests, and vis-versa when wet. 
However, the opposite conclusion should be drawn for every other year – protests 




Table 2: The Effects of Precipitation, Quality of Life, and Ethno-Religious 
Fragmentation on the Frequency of Protests Per Unit Population 
Negative Binomial Regression Results: IRR(Lower Confidence Level, Upper Confidence 
Level) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Climate Indicators 
SPI 2010   1.17(1.05,1.31) 1.02(0.89,1.16) 0.92(0.78,1.08) 
SPI 2011   1.11(0.94,1.33) 0.92(0.73,1.16) 0.73(0.58,0.93) 
SPI 2012   1.83(1.52,2.20) 1.57(1.27,1.94) 1.60(1.27,2.03) 
SPI 2013   0.71(0.58,0.87) 0.14(0.53,1.09) 0.75(0.80,1.12) 
SPI 2014   2.18(1.83,2.60) 2.39(1.90,3.02) 2.34(1.85,2.96) 
SPI 2015   1.64(1.42,1.91) 0.96(1.20,1.68) 1.46(1.23,1.73) 
SPI 2016   0.88(0.76,1.04) 0.85(0.74,0.99) 0.93(0.79,1.09) 
Climate Indicators Squared 
SPI 20102    1.13(1.1,1.25) 1.16(1.04,1.30) 
SPI 20112    1.54(1.30,1.84) 1.64(1.37,1.96) 
SPI 20122    1.03(0.83,1.28) 0.96(0.77,1.20) 
SPI 20132    0.95(0.80,1.12) 0.95(0.80,1.12) 
SPI 20142    1.25(1.05,1.47) 1.35(1.13,1.62) 
SPI 20152    0.96(0.84,1.09) 0.93(0.82,1.06) 
SPI 20162    0.88(0.81,0.96) 0.91(0.83,0.99) 
Quality of Life Indicators 
Employment 
Rate 
 0.95(0.93,0.98)   0.98(0.95,1.00) 
Income Per-
Capita 
 1.02(1.01,1.03)   1.00(1.00,1.01) 
Literacy Rate  1.00(1.00,1.02)   1.03(1.01,1.05) 
Infant Mortality  0.97(0.95,0.98)   0.99(0.98,1.01) 
Ethno-Religious Fragmentation Indicators 
Religious 
Heterogeneity 
 0.83(0.70,0.98)   0.89(0.77,1.02) 
Seats Held by 
the BJP 
 0.99(0.98,1.00)   1.00(1.00,1.01) 
Population 
Protected Caste 
 1.00(0.98,1.01)   1.00(0.99,1.03) 
Population 
Protected Tribe 
 1.00(0.99,1.02)   1.00(0.99,1.01) 
Control Variables 
Urbanicity 1.03(1.02,1.04) 1.02(1.01,1.03) 1.04(1.03,1.04) 1.04(1.03,1.04) 1.03(1.02,1.04) 
AIC 3571 3514 3272 3217 3202 
BIC 3584 3561 3315 3290 3309 
Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI) and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) are abbreviated. An exposure term for Population 
(Thousand Persons) is also included. The sample size is constant across all models. N = 533. Coefficients reported as Incident Rate 




Hypothesis H3 predicts a negative association between employment and protests. 
This hypothesis is supported by model 2, but falls out in the full model, perhaps 
indicating that the relationship is either mediated or moderated by SPI after the 
employment rate is measured in 2011. 
Hypothesis H4 predicts that income per capita is positively associated with 
protests. Again, this is supported by the model 2 and falls out in the model 4.  
H5 predicts that the literacy rate is positively associated with protests, and is 
supported by the full model. It is unclear why this variable was not supported in the 
social only model, but perhaps a suppression effect is indicated. Contrary to expectations, 
the literacy rate was not associated with protests in the social only model. 
Hypothesis H6 predicts that infant mortality will be positively associated with 
protests. This is contradicted by the social only model, which indicates that as the infant 
mortality rate rises, the frequency of protests falls. This result may be because the 
relationship between infant mortality rates and better specified with a nonlinear term. 
Hypothesis H7 predicts that religious heterogeneity will have a positive 
association with the frequency of protests. This hypothesis is contradicted by model 2. 
This may be because more religiously heterogeneous places are politically 
disenfranchised by the current ruling BJP party. Religious heterogeneity falls out in the 
full model. This may indicate that the relationship between religious heterogeneity and 
protests is either mediated or moderated by precipitation. 
As predicted by Hypothesis H8, seats held by the BJP are negatively associated 
with protests, likely because these are the places already represented by the ruling 
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political party. This term also falls out in the full model, and may also be suppressed by 
the presence of SPI terms. 
Two closely related hypotheses, H9 and H10 were not supported. H9 predicts that 
the percent population in a scheduled caste and the percent population in a scheduled 
tribe will each have a positive association with protests. Contrary to expectations, neither 
term was significant in either the social only or the full model. 
As expected, urbanicity is significant in every estimated model, and is relatively 
stable across models both in terms of the IRR and confidence interval. This finding only 
reiterates a well-established fact that urbanicity is one of the most important predictors of 
unrest available, regardless of the context. 
Nonlinear terms allow the frequency of protests to increase in the dry direction 
and the wet direction simultaneously. Figure two illustrates the shape of the predicted 
curvilinear relationship for every year of SPI included in the analysis. The interpretation 
of each line chart below is the same. The marginal predicted frequency of protest events 
is calculated for a range of SPI values from -3 to 2.6 and plotted on a line chart. Model 4 
(curvilinear SPI and urbanicity only), is indicated with a dashed line while Model 5 (the 
full model) is indicated with a solid line. 
As in the linear model, the shape of each curved line is not consistent across 
years. Curvilinear terms were significant for the years 2012, 2014, 2015, and 2016 in 
model 4 and years 2011, 2012, 2014, and 2015 in model 5. This result is largely 
consistent with hypothesis H2b, which states that SPI will have a curved relationship with 
the frequency of protests. However, the direction and shape of the curved lines in 
inconsistent across years, and it is therefore somewhat difficult to interpret. Although, 
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protests broadly tend to increase as SPI moves away from the mean at zero, 2016 predicts 




Figure 2: Curvilinearity in the Predicted Rate of Protests over Population 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Taken together, these results indicate that regional climate change (as gauged by 
deviation in precipitation) is likely related to levels of protest at the district level.  While 
the independent variables are temporally antecedent to the outcome variable (which 
suggests a direct causal link), it is important to note that the 5-year time lag between the 
climate-related indicators and the protest variable weakens the rationale for making such 
a causal argument.  For that reason, as well as the fact that the analysis essentially uses 
cross-sectional data for both the predictor and the outcome, it is more appropriate to 
describe regional climate change as associated with protest levels, in complex ways.  
With the exception of 2013 and 2016, unusually wet districts are more likely to 
experience higher levels of protest. 
Many variables that are significant in the social only model drop out in the full 
model. It is entirely possible that this is because precipitation moderates, or, given a 
compelling causal argument, mediates the relationship between social indicators and 
protest. More advanced modeling techniques such as those found in structural equation 
modeling (SEM) methodology may help future researchers to elaborate the set of 
underlying mechanisms that explain the relationships in the data. In general, the results 
are highly suggestive of the hypothesis that climate moderates the relationship between 
protest and social demographic indicators. It is difficult to theoretically justify the idea 
that climate mediates the effects of social and demographic variables on unrest, because it 
is unclear how social variables like income or infant mortality cause deviation from mean 
precipitation. However, it does seem likely that deviation from mean precipitation 
changes the degree of the association between social variables and unrest. 
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Likewise, results suggest that social inequalities and quality of life indicators are 
associated with protest levels. The employment rate, and infant mortality rate were found 
to negatively associate with protests, income per capita was positively associated with 
protests and while the literacy rate was not significant in the social only model, it became 
significant in the full model. These results provide support for the idea that inequalities, 
particularly those related to quality of life matter for predicting protest (Alexander 2010; 
Buhaug 2011; Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017; Goldstone 2010; Regan and Norton 2005). 
This analysis extends previous research that focuses primarily on violent conflict to 
nonviolent protest events (e.g. Burke et al. 2009; Carleton, Hsang and Burke 2016; 
Hendrix and Salehyan 2012; Hsiang, Burke and Miguel 2013; Jones, Mattiacci, and 
Braumoeller 2017; Kelley et al. 2015; Meier, Bond, and Bond 2007; Raleigh and 
Kniveton 2012). 
Results for Ethno-Religious Fragmentation were somewhat less consistent than 
quality of life measures. Religious heterogeneity and seats held by the BJP were both 
found to be important predictors of a decrease in protest levels, which provides some 
limited support for the hypothesis from others that ethnic and racial contact leads to 
intergroup conflict and social unrest, as well as the finding that religious heterogeneity 
decreases inter-religious trust (Beck 2000; Cederman et al. 2011; Gubler 2012; Olson and 
Li 2015). Although the relationship is significant, the direction is contrary to the 
hypotheses provided above. The negative direction may be explained by the fact that the 
BJP is in power – there is less reason for the majority Hindu population to engage in 
protest. The percent scheduled caste and percent scheduled tribe were not significant. It is 
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possible that an ethnic heterogeneity measure similar to the religious heterogeneity 
measure is more appropriate here. 
One limitation of this analysis are indicated by the predicted number of protests 
per thousand persons indicated by the model (but not reported). Predicted marginal 
frequencies are for these models are much larger than would be expected based on the 
observed frequency of protests. These large predicted marginal frequencies are likely a 
consequence of some as yet unresolved multicollinearity, which may exaggerate some 
model coefficients. 
Additionally, climate is not just a matter of precipitation. A temperature measure 
might very well improve the climatological side of the model. In this analysis, 
precipitation is measured over the course of the entire year. However, more granular 
measures of deviations in precipitation (e.g., over the course of a few months rather than 
an entire year) might capture the short-term (or long-term) impact of disasters such as 
flooding more effectively. Additionally, this analysis is focused on India, and so the 
results might not be generalizable to other places. 
On one had a merit of this analysis was that it addresses some of the limitations of 
previous research. Studies of precipitation are relatively rare, and those that do exist often 
only include a single year of data. Moreover, raw precipitation is often used rather than 
the standardized precipitation index, and raw precipitation doesn’t account for the 
historical unusualness of the precipitation. 
However, these results raise new questions that merit future work. First, the 
potential influence of climate on other forms of unrest such as riots, civil conflict, or 
political revolution merit further consideration. Next, parts of India experience an annual 
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monsoon season, which may be an important driver of protest events in India. The 
monsoon season may have consequences for property damage as well as the quality of 
drinking water (Kumar et al. 2011). Future research can address this by focusing on 
measures of SPI during the monsoon season or dry season only, rather than a full year. 
Finally, another issue to take up in future work is the potential mediating or moderating 
relationships that are indicated by the tendency for socio-demographic indicators to fall 
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APPENDIX A: Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
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